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El Salvador
FMLN Proposals for Negotiating a Just and Lasting Peace in El Salvador
Envío team
On September 13-15, 1989, in Mexico City, leaders of the Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation met for the first time with representatives of the new ARENA government of El Salvador. Comandantes Joaquín Villalobos and Shafik Handel headed the seven-member FMLN delegation. The government delegation was made up of Minister of the Presidency Col. Juan Antonio Martínez, Justice Minister Oscar Santamaría and President Cristiani's personal representative David Escobar Galindo. Also attending were Salvadoran businessman Avelardo Torres, Rector of the New San Salvador University Hernán Contreras, and two representatives from the Bishops Conference of El Salvador—Auxiliary Bishop Gregorio Rosa Chávez and Conference President Romeo Tobar Astorga.
On that occasion, the FMLN brought a summary proposal outlining a three-phase program for a definitive cessation of hostilities and the incorporation of the FMLN into political life. The first phase, a cease-fire to be agreed to by November 15, was based on the negotiated agreement to eight points contained in the proposal.
The ARENA delegation, which brought no proposal, refused to consider the points, conditioning any discussion on the FMLN first laying down its weapons. President Cristiani underscored this position later in the month during a trip to Europe, saying that "if the FMLN ceases hostilities, that would be sufficient to initiate the peace process." Fidel Chávez Mena, the Christian Democrats' defeated presidential candidate in the March 1989 elections, on the other hand, characterized the FMLN's proposal as "a flexible offer, which provides sufficient guidelines to begin a process of negotiation."
The only positive outcome of that round of negotiations was that both sides agreed to meet again within a month. Thus, a second round was held in San Jose, Costa Rica, on October 16-17. On that occasion, the FMLN brought detailed proposals on the points to be negotiated for an immediate cease-fire. The government delegation claimed it had no authorization to agree to, or sign, anything. Another round was set for November 20-21 in Caracas, Venezuela.
Before that round could take place, 10 leaders of the trade union confederation FENASTRAS were killed and 30 others wounded by a bomb placed in their meeting center. The Cristiani government tried to place the blame everywhere but on itself, while Undersecretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Bernard Aronson suggested it could have been done "by either of the two extremes." Insisting that the extremist ARENA government is itself responsible for such actions, which include an increased number of detentions, disappearances, murders and persecution of members of popular organizations and opposition parties, the FMLN broke off the next round of talks.
In the first weeks of November, the FMLN sent messages to and met with numerous Latin American presidents, as well as representatives of the United Nations, the Organization of American States and the Catholic Church, exhorting them to contribute to the establishment of conditions that would permit the resumption of the talks. The FMLN also petitioned that President Cristiani and representatives of the military chiefs of staff attend the negotiations. But it was all to no avail. On November 10, presidential sources said that the FMLN's petition could not be met. Three days earlier Vice President Francisco Merino charged that the FMLN was internationally isolated and should accept its defeat, and the day after that Roberto D'Aubuisson added that the FMLN's opportunity for dialogue was exhausted. On November 11, the FMLN initiated its nationwide military offensive to try to force the government and armed forces to the negotiating table.
We include below the text of the FMLN proposals offered in the two rounds of negotiations in Mexico city and San Jose.
FMLN Proposal to Achieve Democratization, an End to Hostilities
and a Just and Lasting Peace in El SalvadorTaken to the talks held in Mexico City, September 13-15, 1989.
Peace is the greatest aspiration and demand of all Salvadorans. Now, after 10 years of war, El Salvador has before it the best possibility for responding to this longing.
On January 24, 1989, the FMLN made a proposal that brought the possibility of peace closer than ever. That opportunity was frustrated. However, now the broad consensus of the political parties and social forces of El Salvador, along with the agreements signed by the Central American Presidents in Tela, Honduras, reaffirming Esquipulas II, have given new life to the chances for peace.
The FMLN, with a profound patriotic sentiment and sense of international responsibility, now presents a new proposal to end the war by political means, thus responding to the entire nation's aspiration for peace. This is a historic opportunity for the entire nation. Therefore, we expect a patriotic attitude on the part of the Armed Forces and the Government of El Salvador that would make it possible to arrive at agreements and achieve peace. Likewise, we expect the constructive cooperation of the government of the United States of America.
I. Cease-fireTo be agreed upon no later than November 15, 1989, based on the following points:
a. Initiation of a process of reform of the judicial system, appointing a Supreme Court of Justice and an Attorney General of the Republic by consensus between the government and the opposition parties.
b. Agreement on a set of measures to ensure the end of all forms of repression and the full enjoyment of democratic freedoms. These measures should be verified by the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of American States (OAS).
c. Agreement to proceed with an honest judicial process that guarantees clarifying those responsible for and sentencing those guilty in the assassination of Monsignor Romero, and of all persons involved in the death squads. While the trial is pending, the officials implicated shall be suspended from their duties.
d. Agreement to defuse the economic basis of the political and social confrontation by upholding the reforms promoted by the previous government. Suspension of the return to their previous owners of lands affected by the agrarian reform and removal of legal obstacles to the implementation of Phase II of the agrarian reform. Suspension of measures that generate increases in the cost of living, especially the prices of basic goods.
e. Agreement on measures for the self-cleansing and professionalizing of the Armed Forces that would allow the opening of real spaces for the democratization of the country.
f. Commitment that the government will submit to the Legislative Assembly, for its approval, the Constitutional reforms that result from the negotiation.
g. Agreement to moving up the date of the 1991 legislative and municipal elections, so as to make the constitutional reform feasible in the shortest time possible, and to bring closer the end to the war and the attainment of a just and lasting peace in our country.
h. Mutual operational guarantees and guarantees for the quartering of the forces to ensure that the cease-fire remains effectively in force, without this implying a division of the national territory.
II. Initial steps for incorporating the FMLN into political lifeOnce the cease-fire agreement is reached, no later than 15 November, the FMLN is willing to take the first step towards its incorporation into the nation's political life by integrating, as a political party, its leaders and political activists, as well as its radio stations and other press and information units into the legal framework.
This would be a most important and historic step along the path of democratization. It is a step that implies major risks, but we are willing to assume them as an expression of effective will, even if the negotiations for a definitive end to hostilities have not been completed.
III. Negotiation for the definitive end of hostilities and total integration of the FMLN into the nation's political life(No later than January 31, 1990.)
Once the cease-fire is implemented, negotiations will begin for the definitive end of the armed struggle, based on the following points:
a. Approval by the present Legislative Assembly of the draft constitutional reform agreed upon in the negotiations, and implementation of the suitable mechanisms for moving up the date of legislative and municipal elections.
b. Restructuring of the electoral system and reforms to the electoral law, with the participation of all legal parties and parties in the process of being formed.
c. A specific agreement for recognizing a single national army, and its gradual reduction in size to that which is strictly necessary for defending national sovereignty.
d. Dissolution of the security forces and the formation of a single security force under civilian command.
e. Agreement to propose to the Congress of the United States of America the transformation of military assistance into an aid fund for the country's economic and social recovery.
Cmdr. Shafik Jorge Handal
Cmdr. Joaquín Villalobos
Cmdr. Salvador Sánchez Ceren
Cmdr. Eduardo Sancho
Cmdr. Francisco Jovel
FMLN Proposal
An official summary of what was taken to the talks held in San Jose, Costa Rica, October 16,1989.
Main points of the FMLN proposal for reforms of the 1983 ConstitutionThe FMLN proposes to reform the 1983 Constitution based on procedures established in that Constitution. This would require a political agreement with the Salvadoran government on which articles of the current Constitution should be revised.
The Main Points Propose Constitutional Reforms in the Following Areas:
1. Agrarian reform
a. The 1983 Constitution bars the implementation of the second phase of the 1980 Agrarian Reforms. In this way, fundamental reforms that open the way to a just and lasting peace remain blocked.
b. Legislation to include the participation of peasants who are beneficiaries of the agrarian reforms in the mechanisms of management and control of those reforms.
c. To ameliorate the problem—actually irresolvable—of agrarian debt, there should be a transitional disposition for the forgiveness of that debt and the free transfer of the lands granted under the agrarian reform should be instituted. In all cases, the state should assume the compensation of the former landholders.
2. Armed forces
The reforms concerning the Armed Forces proposed by the FMLN are oriented toward:
a. Guaranteeing the effective subordination of the Armed Forces to the democratically elected civil authorities.
b. Guaranteeing strict respect for human rights, honesty, technical improvement, professionalizing of the Armed Forces and their exercise of the defense of democracy.
c. The substitution of the current security forces by one professional civilian police force that is not subordinated to military leadership.
d. To grant the President of the Republic effective command—not merely formal—of the Armed Forces, and ascribe to the Council of Ministers the determination of the number of permanent army effectives and civil police.
e. To prohibit the participation of Armed Forces of El Salvador in regional or international military blocs or treaties.
f. To assure the gradual total demilitarization of Salvadoran society.
3. Elections
The country's current electoral system is rigid and does not allow adequate and agile political responses to changing situations and social crisis. For this reason, the FMLN's proposed Constitutional reforms regarding elections are oriented toward:
a. To garner the experience of some of the more modern and developed democratic systems so as to make the convocation of the presidential, legislative and municipal elections more flexible.
b. To broaden the constitutional criteria for the composition of the Central Electoral Council to insure political pluralism.
4. Other measures to assure political pluralism
a. To guarantee representation, the number of deputies to the Legislative Assembly should be increased to one for each 40,000 inhabitants or fraction greater than 20,000 inhabitants.
b. To make the election of Governors the responsibility of the Legislative Assembly.
Main points of the FMLN proposal to end repression and guarantee democratic freedoms1. The fundamental purpose is to prevent intimidation, raids, captures, assassinations, torture, military cordons and all forms of repression of the popular movement. Thus, the dismissal and prosecution of those officials and subordinates who violate the accords on the cessation of repression must be assured.
2. As a temporary guarantee mechanism, we propose the creation of a Supervisory Commission for Respect for Human Rights, which includes the participation of political and social forces, the Government, Armed Forces, FMLN and observers from the OAS and the United Nations.
3. Considering that these accords and the proposed Commission would be of a temporary nature, we propose the approval of a Law for the Defense and Guarantee of Human Rights which has as its aim the permanent protection of society from abuses of power and authority by the State.
Main points of the FMLN proposal for initiating reforms of the judicial systemThe FMLN has made just one demand for initiating a process of reforms of the judicial system: this is the election of a new Supreme Court of Justice and a new Attorney General of the Republic by consensus between the government and the opposition parties.
In order to implement this change we propose that the Governmental Dialogue Commission request that the Supreme Court of Justice call the political parties and the Attorney General to a joint meeting in San Salvador by Oct. 24 of this year at the latest.
Main points of the FMLN proposal for the self-cleansing and professionalizing of the armed forces1. The fundamental aim is the removal of the hegemonic group within the Armed Forces, which has developed great economic interests through the war and consistently obstructed possibilities for a negotiated agreement to achieve peace. Currently, the most acute expression of this phenomenon within the Armed Forces is the group of officials from the 35th graduating class. The dismantling of this group is a prior step to the self-cleansing of the Salvadoran Army.
2. To prevent the creation of new hegemonic groups that monopolize power, the posts of Minister and Vice-Minister of Defense and Public Security and the Directors of the so-called Security Forces should be civilians whose appointment requires a consensus of the political forces of the country.
3. Given these steps, the officers of the army themselves will be able to cleanse the Armed Forces, making use of the democratic mechanism of the General Assembly which has been used on other occasions.
4. To strengthen the professionalism and lend dignity to the Armed Forces, the current Military School must be transformed gradually into a Military University in which the cadets study a scientific, technical or humanistic field in addition to their military preparation.
Main points of the FMLN discussion of a cease-fire1. A cease-fire is a first step toward the conclusive end of hostilities. It is necessarily linked to the realization of agreements that guarantee an end to repression, the protection of democratic freedoms and respect for human rights.
2. A United Nations commission of observers should verified the cease-fire.
3. For the cease-fire to be effective and lasting, all military offensives, by both parties, should be suspended and geographic delimitations that separate the encampments of the Armed Forces and the FMLN should be established.
Main points of the FMLN proposal concerning basic economic measures for a cease-fire and definitive end of hostilities1. Suspend evictions and court actions to return lands granted under the 1980 Agrarian Reforms to original landowners.
2. A joint economic and social pact between the government and the private and labor sectors to establish and obtain mutual commitments that will allow us to resolve the economic crisis with the support and sacrifice shared by all sectors.
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