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Central American University - UCA  
  Number 194 | Septiembre 1997

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Mexico

Elections: One Step Forward and Many Unknowns

Rafael Moreno

Elections were held on July 6 for the entire federal House of Representatives and 32 of the 126 Senate seats, together with local elections in the Federal District and 6 other states. The head of the government and all Legislative Assembly members were up for election in the Federal District, along with the governors and their respective local councils in the 6 states. Mexicans also elected 220 municipal presidents.

Commentaries about the results of these important elections may vary, because the Federal Judicial Branch's Electoral Tribunal will not issue decisions on over 200 legal claims challenging some results until the end of August. Based on 58 of those challenges, the incumbent Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), hopes to hold on to its absolute majority in the House of Representatives. And the Democratic Revolution Party (PRD) hopes to annul the federal elections in the Ocosingo and Palenque districts, in Chiapas, and the victory of the PRI candidate for governor in the state of Campeche.
The elected representatives and senators take office on September 1, while the new head of the Federal District, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, does not take office until December 1. It is thus too early to offer opinions about changes in forms of government and in the orientation of the new legislature.

Electoral Geography Changed

PRI: In the 1994 elections, the PRI pulled the majority of votes in all 31 states and the Federal District. Three years later, it is still the only party with a significant presence throughout the national territory, but only maintains its majority in 22 states. It has a comfortable lead in 11 of them (Baja California Sur, Coahuila, Chiapas, Hidalgo, Nayarit, Oaxaca, Puebla, Quintana Roo, Tamaulipas, Tlaxcala and Zacatecas). In the Federal District and in nine states it is now the second force. It lost votes in the Federal District and in 30 states and only in 1 (Chiapas) did it maintain the same number of votes as in 1994.

PAN: The National Action Party (PAN) has consolidated its presence primarily in the Republic's north and central regions. It is a majority in 7 states (Baja California, Colima, Chihuahua, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Nuevo León and Querétaro). It is the second force in 11 (Aguascalientes, Baja California Sur, Coahuila, Durango, Nayarit, Puebla, San Luis Potosí, Sinaloa, Sonora, Yucatán and Zacatecas). It increased its votes in 18 states, maintained the same proportion in 2 (Hidalgo and Sonora) and lost votes in the Federal District and in 11 states.

PRD: The PRD is getting stronger predominantly in the country's south and central regions. It has a majority in the Federal District and in 2 states (Michoacán, Morelos). It is the second force in 11 (Chiapas, Campeche, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Mexico, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Tamaulipas, Tlaxcala and Veracruz). It increased its votes in the Federal District and in 28 states, in 2 it maintained the same proportion of votes (Nuevo León and Veracruz) and in 1 it probably dropped (Chiapas).

New Political Correlations

The elections obviously modified the political correlation of forces. The PRI lost the majority it had in the Senate that allowed it to pass even legislation requiring a two-thirds vote; in the new Legislature it will have 77 of the 128 senators (60%).

It also lost its simple majority in the House of Representatives: it will have 239 representatives (47.8%); the PRD will have 125 (25%), the PAN 122 (24.4%), the Green Party 8 (1.6%) and the Labor Party 6 (1.2%).

The PRI lost the Federal District government to the PRD, and two other governorships (Nuevo León and Querétaro) to the PAN, which join 4 others this party had already won in previous elections (Baja California, Chihuahua, Jalisco and Guanajuato).
The PRI has lost the majority of state capitals. By losing 4 capitals more in these elections, the PRI governs today in only 15 of 31, the PAN in 14, the PRD in 1 and the Labor Party in 1.

The PRI has also lost the majority of locally governed populations. Before the elections it governed some 50.9% of the Mexican population, the PAN 36.9%, the PRD 10.7%, and other parties 0.5%. Currently the PRI governs 40.2%, the PAN 40.1%, the PRD 19.2% and other parties 0.5%. Of the 2,378 municipalities nationwide, the PRI retains 1,755, the PAN now has 311 and the PRD 251.

In synthesis, all the highly populated capitals and those with the greatest political and economic importance, except Chihuahua and Toluca, are locally governed by the opposition. A total of 47.38% of the annual total value generated by the Mexican economy and 77.13% of bank savings come from the Federal District and these 16 capitals, and 43.8% of the largest exporting industries are located there.

Cuauhtémoc: A Great Triumph

The elections illustrated that the PRI had the most productive distribution of its votes in terms of federal representatives. Thus the results do not directly reflect the substantial modifications in the political geography because 300 of the 500 representatives in the House correspond to the same number of districts into which the national territory is divided. All of them are elected by a relative majority in each district. Of these 300 seats, the PRI won 54.66%, the PRD 23.33% and the PAN 21.66%. The remaining 200 representatives are selected by proportional representation. They are elected according to the proportion obtained in the 5 electoral districts. In this election the PRI obtained 39.1%, the PAN 26.61% and the PRD 25.72%.

Finally, the elections were a resounding and undisputed triumph for Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas as candidate for the governorship of the Federal District: he won by a wide margin (47.11%), followed by the PRI candidate (27.32%). It was one election that was not challenged by any of the contenders.

The End of Presidentialism

How should the electoral results be interpreted?The elections expressed a majority rejection of the current neoliberal governing policy. The citizenry identifies the PRI with the effects of the economic crisis, with corruption, with impunity, with social insecurity and with the abuse of power by ex-President Salinas. According to a poll in the Federal District published in the daily Reforma, 62% of those who voted for the PRD and 46% of those who voted for the PAN disapprove of President Ernesto Zedillo's administration. Seventy-six percent of those who supported the PRD and 68% of those who voted for the PAN decided their vote more than one month before election day. They were not influenced by the candidate debates and few could have been influenced by the content of their programs or the electoral campaign.

There has been a shift in the population's electoral preferences, from the right center to the left center.

The elections were a limited advance in representative democracy, opening encouraging perspectives for the exercise of a tripartite democracy. After several decades, there will be a real parliamentary force because the PRI has lost its absolute majority in the Senate. In addition, municipal political power, and in part state power as well, has been more evenly distributed among three parties: the PRI, the PRD and the PAN. This should not generate too much expectation, however, because the opposition does not yet have the ability to approve substantial reforms—those requiring a two-thirds vote in the legislature—on its own, and because, for budgetary and political reasons, the municipal government in Mexico depends largely on the state government and the state depends on the federal government.

The elections initiate the end of a presidentialist government. The new composition of the Senate allows the legislative branch to distance itself somewhat from the executive branch. The President of the Republic will have to negotiate his legislative proposals and budget with the opposition to avoid political paralysis or ungovernability.

Depending on how the PRD and PAN benches and the Federal District and 6 other opposition governors develop their methods and pressure, there should be space to exercise a relative federalism that modifies, among other things, the state budget assignments.

PRI: Image and Reality

All of this does not mean that Mexico has reached "democratic normalcy." President Zedillo wanted to use the elections to project the image that Mexico respects the law and lives in full democratic normalcy. With this he hopes to cover the growing militarization and increase in human rights violations, delegitimize the Zapatista uprising and thereby the San Andrés negotiations, giving the impression that they are not necessary. He would have everyone believe that society can freely exercise its right to be represented by political parties and therefore the only way to resolve conflicts is "institutionally," which means negotiation between leaders of different parties represented in Congress.

Zedillo also wants to strengthen the government's limited new tendency to tolerate representative democracy by restricting participatory democracy as much as possible. In fact, the existing electoral law protects the political parties' monopoly on electoral participation and on assuming political representation of the citizenry, and does not permit the existence of non-party candidacies, restricting the mechanisms for their participation.

The PRI's "Hardline Vote"

The elections do not signify a change of political control over the government apparatus. The PRI still exercises a determinant control. Furthermore, the PRD and PAN victories are not enough to modify or reverse neoliberal policy orientation and development. If the July 6 elections had been presidential, the votes obtained by the PRI in the federal elections for senators would have been enough to maintain the Presidency of the Republic.

Various other factors influenced the electoral results:
The need for the PRI-government to carry out relatively unquestioned elections to achieve a certain legitimacy, especially internationally. The erosion of the PRI-government regime is so great that it could not carry out massive frauds in urban zones, because that would have discredited the elections and made government administration even more difficult.

The majority decision of the urban population in favor of a change of government. The majority of the hardline PRI vote is in rural areas, among those with less schooling and over 50. According to the Reforma poll, 58% of those in the Federal District who voted for the official party did not finish preparatory studies. In contrast, 69% of those who voted for the PAN and 59% of those who voted for the PRD have studied at the university level or finished their preparatory studies. Forty-nine percent of the voters in the Federal District over 50 voted for the PRI and 53% of those under 50 voted for the PRD.

This is probably because the urban inhabitants have most deeply suffered the effects of the economic crisis and social insecurity, and have more resources to keep themselves from being influenced by the PRI vote buying and pressure, above all if they are educated and of working age.

The popularity and leadership of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas influenced the overwhelming PRD triumph in the Federal District.

Opposition Abilities And Disabilities

There is evidence to hope that, as a consequence of the PRD electoral advances, certain secondary readjustments will be made to the government economic plan and the country's political structure that could benefit the majority of the popular sectors. There could be some social and environmental improvements as well as more possibility of access to public posts.

Expectations should not be so exaggerated that they forget the limited ability of the PRD bench in the Senate and the PRD head of the Federal District government; neither will be able to substantially change the neoliberal policies promoted by the federal government.

The existing divisions in the PRD will also have a limiting influence on this ability to bring about change. So will the bad habits and political positions not so distant from the PRI of some of its current officials or leaders— many of them ex-PRI members. Many of them also have very limited legislative or administrative experience. In addition, the vision of integral development within the legislative platforms of the opposition parties is very weak.

The very short time period that Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas will be in his post—the full period is only three years—is another factor to take into account. If he decides to run for the Presidency the period will be even less; he will have to resign in mid-1999.

Chiapas: What to Expect?

What can the indigenous peoples expect from the electoral results? Even though they are encouraging, they will not automatically signify better conditions to resolve the dramatic situation of indigenous peoples or to achieve a just and lasting political solution to the Chiapas conflict.

The Chiapas negotiation process is in profound crisis. It lacks viable proposals to get beyond the impasse of almost a year, given the lack of sufficient pressure to demand that the government implement the constitutional reform accords relating to indigenous culture and rights. Communication between the two sides continues to be interrupted and there are few possibilities to contact the EZLN because the National Mediation Commission (CONAI) has weakened, the Verification and Follow-up Commission to the San Andrés Accords (COSEVE) has been unable to act, etc.

As the hopes for a negotiated solution have waned, the EZLN has opted to expand its area of influence and promote autonomy in its communities without waiting for this to be constitutionally recognized. The government, for its part, has increased militarization of the zone and is claiming that the paramilitary groups are making it ungovernable. All of this could lead to a renewal of the armed conflict.

The San Andrés Accords

Despite the complex situation, the issue of the government's failure to fulfill the San Andrés accords was ignored by the candidates during their electoral campaign. In fact, the whole indigenous issue was generally absent from the campaign. None of the demands of the indigenous peoples included in the San Andrés accords was incorporated into the new electoral reform legislation. The new makeup of the Senate now offers the possibility of a better correlation of votes in favor of the constitutional reforms derived from the Chiapas negotiation, but does not assure their approval, because PRI support is required to reach the two-thirds vote.

The positive image President Zedillo won for the way he carried out the elections gives him more room to manage the Chiapas negotiations. After the elections, he appears to be more in favor of incorporating the EZLN into institutional life as an organized political force than in fulfilling what he agreed to and continuing to negotiate the already agreed upon agenda with the Zapatistas.

The expectations that the electoral results generated among the popular sectors could turn their attention to other interests, relegating the defense of indigenous rights to a second level.

Inertia and Weakness

Within the labor sector, the electoral results, together with the recent death of two major promoters of union corporativism (Fidel Velásquez and Blas Chumacero) and the space lost in the Senate by officialist worker leaders proposed as PRI candidates, has created better conditions to fight for labor justice in the Federal District and promote independent unionism.

These new circumstances will probably not be fully taken advantage of by the labor sector because of official or patron control, inertia, weakness and skepticism among the majority of Mexican workers.

Everything remains to be seen. And everyone will have to wait, even with hopes measured and moderated by reality.

RELEVANT ELECTORAL DATA
* The results were not greatly challenged by the participating parties. In 1991 there were 465 challenges, and in 1994, 1,232. This time there were only about 200.

* A fraction under 58% of registered voters went to the ballots. The greatest abstention level was in the indigenous zones, above all Chiapas, where it reached almost 65%.

* The change in the overall electoral geography affected
the proportions of the results in each of the electoral 5 districts into which the country is divided for electing representatives and senators. In the first such district, which includes California Sur, Baja California, Sonora, Sinaloa, Nayarit, Jalisco, Colima and Guanajuato, the PAN won 42.42%, the PRI 34.9% and the PRD 15.35%.

* In the second district (Aguascalientes, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Durango, Nuevo León, Querétaro, Tamaulipas, San Luis Potosí and Zacatecas), the PRI won 39.95%, the PAN 37.44% and the PRD 13.15%.

* In the third (Campeche, Chiapas, Quintana Roo, Tabasco,
Veracruz and Yucatán), the PRI won 43.59%, the PRD 27.31% and the PAN 22.58%.

* In the fourth (Federal District, Hidalgo, Morelos, Tlaxcala
and Puebla), the PRD won 35.3%, the PRI 32.5% and the PAN 21.29%.

* In the fifth (Guerrero, Mexico and Michoacán), the
PRD won 36.42%, the PRI 34.63% and the PAN 19.36%.

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